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I, Introduction 
The relation between macro-social structure and individual-level 
action is a central problem of sociology (Giddens). A fundamental 
sociological premise is that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts;" 
this is the essence of the term structure. Structural analysis promises to 
reveal general principles by which social change occurs. And, given the 
ecological, military and other crises the world faces today, the discovery of 
such principles seems imperative. 
Yet, debates about structure often argue past each other; they start 
with different assumptions and seek to attribute causality accordingly. 
Some, for instance, assume that structure means class relations (Althusser), 
others that it means income distribution (Blau and Duncan), bureaucracy 
(Dahrendorf), or symbolic codes typical of a culture (Eisenstadt). These 
disparate definitions allow for no comparison of structural causality. 
Consequently, they weaken the empirical utility of sociology as a discipline. 
Part of the problem is methodological; no satisfactory way has been 
found to operationalize the concept of structure in terms of individual action, 
in a way that would permit distinguishing between different types of 
structures. In this paper, I propose a method that takes a step towards 
resolving this problem. The method combines the structural and individual 
levels through the use of network analysis. With this, I hope to find some 
empirical way of testing for the presence and relative causal importance of 
various types of structure. 
One common employment of the term structure is in studies of the 
distribution and use of power in society. However, the methods used in this 
area often focus on a single set of actors, such as "the power elite," and hence 
do not fully address macro-structural questions (Hunter, Mills). 
Fundamentally, social power involves a relationship. The most basic model 
is the dichotomous division between elite and mass, a rough distinction often 
used in sociology. This model cannot be encompassed by reference to one 
set of actors alone. The distinction between the two sides becomes sharper if 
we counterpose them as elite and challenger: the grassroots social movement 
arising from the mass. Acting upon each other, these actors impose limits 
that structure, or limit the options of, the actions of the other. 
Recent work in the resource mobilization school of social movement 
analysis emphasizes the influence of elites on movement mobilization 
(McCarthy and 2ald; McAdam; Useem; Schwartz). In this view, the very 
ability to mobilize depends greatly upon freeing people and resources from 
the dominant institutions. McAdam shows how elites adjust their strategies 
of social control to new movement strategies, slowing them down until a new 
strategy appears. In the same vein, but couched in more general terms, a 
few works deal with the "political opportunity structure" created by 
dominant institutions, as it facilitates or hinders movement mobilization 
(Lipsky, Eisinger, Tarrow). Skocpol's work constitutes the most large-scale 
example of this perspective. 
In most of these works, however, the elite and dominant institutions 
remain somethlag of a "black box." They appear as foils for the social 
movement, as the structure which movements target and bounce off of. 
Implicit in these works is the assumption of considerable structure among 
the elites:- while movements are seen as fluid, mob- around the issue of 
concern. This image of a fairly solid central polity provides a generic 
"structure" against which movements take shape (Gamson, Tilly, 1978). The . 
dominant institutions and the movements are implicitly portrayed as the 
two extremes of a spectrum of institutionalization. 
However, the dominant institutions may themselves be mote fluid 
than that image conveys. The pluralist tradition captures some of this 
fluidity. In New Haven, Dahl  found many types of elite coalitions. Mayor 
Lee had recently put together one type of coalition, but his predecessor had 
used a different style. Dahl  did not look in depth at social movements. But 
his pluralist model assumed that strong grassroots movements would find 
some voice in the polity. This model has been well criticized (Mandel), but it 
raises important questions. Does a class or state-b ased power structure exist 
as a constant "governor" over society? Or are sections of it activated 
intermittently aording to the issue? Does its basic nature change with the 
change in issues? 
Following those hints, tracing the course of interaction between elites 
and social movements (challengers from outside the polity) would provide a 
better understanding of how dominant structures reproduce themselves and 
change. To do so necesitates thinking of elites and movements as a system: 
a pattern of influence relationships in dynamic interaction over time. Recent 
work in the resource mobilization school focuses on such an interactive 
model ( a d ;  Tilly, 1985a, 198Sb). The most explicit effort has been made by 
McAdam and by Burns and Midttun. The latter present a detailed flow-chart 
of interchanges between institutions over time. These constitute approaches 
to a method that will allow the analysis of change in structure over time. 
Another approach to this task comes from the paradigm of network 
analysis. A network is a set of points and the lines joining them (Berkowitz, 
pg. 2). One type of network, the pattern of relations between organizations, 
provides a promising model for thinking about elites and social movements. 
Research in this area generally focuses on networks of alliances among elites 
(Schwartz and Mintz; Walton) or between organizations (Benson; Cook; 
Laumam, et. al.; Stern). But it could be expanded to look at negative ties, at 
social conflict, as well. This would require redefining the meaning of "tie" to 
include a wider range of sanctions. 
Other problems re main in applying the inter -organizational network 
perspective 'to elite and movement analysis. Models of community' power 
structures us@ the network method, while contributing many insights, 
remain static snapshots, taken at one point in time (Breiger; Laumann and 
Pappi). Patterns of center and periphery are described by clustering and 
block modeling (Berkowitz, pp. 125- 14 1 ). Furthermore, the qualitative types 
of ties such as, negative and positive) between actors are rarely specified 
(for a partial exception, see Laumann and Pappi). Usually, just the existence 
of one type of tie is noted. For a sensitive analysis of structure and change, 
'different types of ties must be distinguished. 
This paper sketches out a method for the dynamic analysis of social 
conflict and structural transformation incorporating network concepts. While 
not quantitatively sophisticated, it provides a conceptual and qualitative 
framework for dealing with these issues. The method, called "sequential 
frame analysis" (SFA), evolved through dealing with field work data about 
social conflict over time. In itself, it is simply a qualitative, data-ordering 
device. But through the ordering, it helps the analyst understand the 
structure present in the interactions. 
The SFA method diagram a political interaction, an event, on a 
"societal frame." The frame is a matrix composed of all the potentially 
relevant types of organizations in the society, arrayed along center to 
periphery on the vertical axis and any convenient ordering scheme along the 
horizontal axis. Any given event is composed of a unique pattern, or set of 
organizational actors and their ties. Each event forms one point in a 
sequence of events, and provides the sociological foundation for the next 
event to arise. A major change in the pattern at time X signals the change to 
a new event. The sequence, then, is composed of genetically linked changes 
in patterned events, each forming the basis for the next. The sequence as a 
whole comprises a "case," the life-course of an issue over time in a 
community or society. Suffice it to say that the sequence of frames provides 
a systematic way to analyze mobilization and counter - mobilization over 
time at the several levels of society. 
Ties are defined as the exchange of sanctions between actors. Here, 
sanctions are defined as desirable or undesirable 'Values" which actor A may 
give to or withold from actor B (the types will be defined later). Careful 
attention to the types of sanctions exercised between organizational actors 
provides clues to the type of "stru&ure" one may call "dominant." That is, if 
a cultural and symbolic "structure" is the dominant organizing principle, the 
actual social organization among the actors will be held together by a 
common belief in the same symbols. The same is true for a class structure, 
in which the common interest is profit from a common type of means of 
production or system of ownership. The symbol or profit which actors 
exchange or collectively strive for is the sanction, which vitalizes the tie 
between the actors. 
For example, the Ayatollah Komeini may use religion to bind together 
his inner core of leaders, but they in turn evidently enforce their will 
through violence, through state terrorism. The cote dominant structure 
here is rehgious (cultural), as defined by the type of tie integrating the 
center of the polity. But this changes into coercive ties, and hence a 
"political" structure, within a short expansion of the circumference of the 
cote. Opposition movements may attack the outer edges of the dominant 
institution with counter-violence, or try to delegitimize the inner core by 
questioning the beliefs of Sunni Islam (or both). 
The sequential frame analysis enables us to trace the dominant 
structure at a given time, and how change is initiated in it and carried 
through. This sensitivity to structural location of the precise sanction which 
broke down, allowing the disintegration of the old structure and the 
production of a new one, offers the possibility of a deeper understanding of 
the actual nature of power in society, and how it may be changed. 
11, The Societal Frame and Sequential Frame Analysis 
In order to adequately analyze .the mobilization of a sochl movement 
and its impact on the status QUO, then, we need knowledge of the following 
substantive phenomena: 1 ) structure of (latent) resource distribution, 2) the 
issue at hand and the potential it has to cause a redistribution of resources, 
3) the groups whose resources are subject to potential redistributiqn, 4) the 
consciousness of those groups concerning the issue, 5 )  the internal resources 
a given group can potentially mobilize (turn into sanctions) to pursue the 
issue, 6) the value (to other groups) given to those sanctions by the issue, 7) 
the configuration of structures (seen as specific inter-organizational 
networks) which confront a given group as obstacles to its purpose, 8) the 
course through time of interactive mobilization and struggle. All these can 
be simultaneously portrayed and accounted fur in the societal frame and its 
sequential analysis. 
The closest graphic portrayal of the societal frame in the extant 
literature is found in the theoretical work of Charles Tilly. He portrays a 
field of politically oriented organizations, some of which are inside the polity 
and some outside it. The polity is conceived of all those orgaiizations which 
have routine, low-cost access to decision-making and its benefits. Groups 
which try to break in to that polity to get their own share are "challengers." 
T q ' s  diagram is presented in Figure One: 
(Figure One about here.) 
His analysis concentrates upon the challengers, in particular the events of 
collective action they engage in. Therefore, the analysis of the polity, of the 
relations among elites that compose it, remains rudimentary. In his scheme, 
the entry of elites into the process of mobilization is represented by a box 
labelled "repression/f acilitation." 
However, if movements have some relation to the particular "shape" of 
the dominant structure, then its details must be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the boundaries of the "polity" must be given theoretical 
definition. As is already evident in Tilly's schematic. many organizations 
occupy the field in which polity members and challengers contend. In order 
to define the dominant institution and structure, the polity, their inter- 
relations must be carefully reconstructed out of constitutent elements. Then, 
they must be traced through transformations. 
The best way to array and visualize this complex number of elements 
is on a "societal frame." A societal frame consists of an array of all the 
organizations in a society potentially involved (directly or indirectly) in a 
given issue or sequence of issues through time (see Figure Two). 
(Figure Two about here.) 
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(extensions of above as well as voluntary orgs. and movements) 
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(Note: this simplified example does not include the ful l  range of institutions) 
These organizations are arrayed vertically along the center and periphery 
dimension. The horizontal arrangement of the institutions is arbitrary, but 
should be convenient for drawing arrows, and remain constant throughout a 
sequence. Each vertical column represents an institution, constituted of 
substantive organizations in a hierarchy. Each box represents a concrete 
organization. The organizations involved in a given event are indicated by 
coloring them in a way which indicates a com mon stance on the issue, and 
drawing arrows between them. The arrows are numbered, with notes below 
indicating the type(s) of sanction creating the tie. 
Theories of "structure," implicitly or overtly, argue that a given actor 
b dominant because it controls certain resources. In creating social power, 
an actor uses a resource as a sanction, to affect the actions of others (to 
determine their social role). The major kind of sanction used by the 
dominant elite indicates the dominant "structure," which effectively 
determines the overall pattern of influence and power. Those sanctions and 
their use play a crucial role in holding the system together. Of course, 
structural theories differ in which sanction they single out as crucial. 
There are numerous typologies of sanctions (Etzioni, Parsons). These 
types of inter-actor sanctions define the different ways "ego" can get "alter" 
to do something. Basically, sanctions range from intrinsic(symbolic) to 
extrinsic (material). Roughly, they may be categorized as political, economic, 
social and cultural. For each type, a characteristic type of sanction is used: 
coercion, inducement, persuasion, and committments, respectively. 
. Exchange theory contends that sanction exchanges build up into 
social structures through exchange and choice, much like markets (Homans, .. 
Blau). In this view, while the ties that bind people or organizations into 
repetitive patterns consist of combinations of these sanctions, there always 
remains an element of free choice. The actors are not "over-socialized." This 
produces a tentative, negotiated quality to structure. A constant dialectic 
between structure and consciousness (Giddens) makes both somewhat 
indeterminate. Social actors are on the lookout for something better, if the 
costs are not too high 
I Parsons presents this typology in one essay (see bibliography). But many 
others also exist. French and Raven define five types of inter-actor power 
resources, which I refer to here: reward, coercion, expert, legitimate, and 
referent. Reward is provision of economic incentives; coercion the use of 
force. Expert refers to the mession of crucial technical knowledge; 
legitimate, the ability to persuade that agreed upon "rules of the game" are 
being adhered to. Referent is the ability to establish identity between alter 
and ego, so that ego acts on behalf of alter as for "self." 
On the other hand, social structures may be highly coercive. The 
sanctions controlled by dominant elites often are so powerful, and the 
alternative choices so costly, that other actors have little real choice but to 
obey. Theories of power usually conceive of structure in this way. In some 
cases, if these structures are under the control of amenable elites, they may 
be subject to negotiation or respond to protest. Other structures, however, 
may result from obstinate elites or natural forces, such as resource scarcity. 
These are less amenable to negotiition. 
In any case, the latitude of choice, the response to structure, differs 
for each actor in each particular role or conjunction of sanctions. Analysis 
must proceed with sensitivity to this latitude. Structure and institution must 
not be prematurely concretized into a monolithic object. They must be 
defined for each case. 
Social movements may be placed within this structural context by the 
types of ties they break or redefine. Breaking with the defined role 
structure is a fundamental act of mobilization. In order to join a movement, 
especially one that opposes the interests of the elites, one must be prepared 
to suffer the sanctions that will come. If, however, the institution one is 
protesting or trying to change applies no sanctions, the only costs are the 
expenditure of personal resources. 
Of course, not every aspect of the social process can appear on the 
frame. The appearance of each organization in the arena of contention, the 
societal frame, presupposes long preparation, mobilization and organizing. 
In additions, a given actor, like the Chamber of Commerce, may represent 
the interests of many member organizations. Classes, strata and other less 
definable social phenomena (public opinion) can only appear through these 
concrete (formal and informal) organizations, which embody their views or 
respond to their demands. 
Thus, the societal frame only deals with the concurrent collective 
action of groups and organizations mobilized around a particular issue. The 
squares within the frame remind one of a chess-board. The organizations 
array like chess pieces, each with certain latent powers and overt moves. 
These latent powers are generally brought into active engagement only 
when their holder thinks it useful to the overall strategy. 
But the political game indicated in the frame is more complicated, 
zany and ironic than chess. Each piece has some autonomy (an important 
empirical question). To that extent, each must conceive its own best strategy 
facing the shifting pattern of the other pieces. Unlike chess (except in Alice 
in Wonderland), the powers allocated to the political pieces shifts over time. 
Queens became pawns. And to add to the confusion, even the side a piece 
allies with may change. Chess pieces are "institutionalized" into black and 
white, permanently. But political knights change color from white to black. 
Or they look black until you pick them up, when they suddenly turn white. 
Rooks revolt, and join the "enemy." 
Evidently, then, the array of organizations itself tells us little about the 
game. Several other elements must be included in the frame. These include, 
as mentioned, the issue position of a given involved organization (including 
ideology and political values if relevant), and arrows representing the ties 
and sanctions applied by one organization to another in the effort to elicit 
compliance. But we also need to include the context, that is, the wider 
pattern of political contention in the society: the issues which capture the 
elite or public imagination, the broad distribution of latent power and its 
direction of change, and the impact of foreign powers. This context gives 
value to the resources held by a given actor. It enables their conversion into 
sanction and power at a certain rate. For instance, money talks louder to the 
poor than the rich, so patrons are more powerful in poor societies. This 
contextual effect is assessed by the qualitative analysis carried out by the 
investigator. 
A new frame must be constructed for each major event within the 
history of struggle over the issue. Or, if several issues are considered in 
sequence, or the first generates the next, each new issue-phase must be 
placed on a separate frame. This procedure will generate a sequence of 
event and issue-context frames. Hence it is called "sequential frame 
analysis." A sample sequence of three frames, including all these elements, 
is presented in Figures Three, Four and Five. 
I will draw an illustrative example of the use of this method from my 
research in Japan. In Figure Three, the governor of rural Fukuzaki 
Prefecture continues his predecessor's policy of heavy industrialization. A 
gigantic steel and oil refinery project had already been built, and the 
governor proposed to double its size by adding on more of the same plus 
processors like synthetic fiber factories. In this, he has the implicit a o r d  of 
the local capitalist class and the branches of national capital located there. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) represents that class in the prefectural 
legislature, and rubber-stamps the governor's pro-development policies. 
But it lets much of the initiation of policy up to the governor (as is common 
in Japan). 
(Figure Three about here) 
In Figure Three, sanctions are not overtly exchanged between the 
major actors (the prefectural government, local and national capital, and the 
LDP) because they operate under a temporary consensus about the virtues of 
industrialization and no other major groups oppose them. Initial objections 
by a small citizens' movement are ignored by the governor. The context is 
G = Governor 
C= Local and Branch Capital 
L = LDP in Prefectural Legislature 
M=Local Citizens' Movement ' 
Issue: Indus t r ia l  Development 
= p r o - ~ e v e l o p m e n t  Stance. ' 
&I = Pro-Environmental P ro tec t i on  Stance. 
Context:  
1.  Nst ione l  f e r vo r  f o r  rep id  economic g rowth .  
2. Pre f  ec tu re l  government p r ide  i n  succes:ul development. 
Sanct ion: 
1. Cepi t a l i s t s  inf luence LDP through campeign financing., 
2. Cap i t a l i s t s  inf luence Governor through e lec tora l  power. 
3. Governor has i n s t i t u t i o n a l  power  over  the legis lature,  
where he i n i t i a t e s  mos t  o f  the  b i l l s .  
4. Governor has i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a b i l i t y  t o  r e j e c t  c i t i z e n  
demands. 
one of high-speed growth in Japan as a whole, and most parties feel it 
necessary for Fukuzaki to follow the trend. 
In Figure Four, all this changes drastically. The citizens' movement 
appeals to the newly-formed Environmental Agency (EA) in the central 
government. More than simply appeal, they eventually go to the EA g r ~  
masse to protest the governor's industrialization policies, reputedly 
intending to stage a riot and throw chairs through windows if they don't get 
some satisfaction. This action would publicly dramatize the environmental 
pollution of Fukuzaki already caused by the project, and cause the EA loss of 
legitimacy by implying that it wasn't doin$ its job (political sanction). 
In turn the EA called the governor and strongly suggested that he 
conduct a formal environmental impact assessment of the planned expansion 
of the industrial project (political sanction with economic implications in 
terms of government funding and approval). The governor did not want to 
anger the EA, nor to look like it could not control its citizens (here the 
movement applied cultural sanctions on him, based on the traditional yet 
still strong ethic that the governor should be the "paterfamilias" of the 
prefectural citizens). In a panic, he called together his staff that morning 
and decided to compromise with the EA and citizens' demands. He issued a 
pronouncement that the industrial project was temporarily "shelved" until 
three conditions were met: environmental impact assessment, citizen 
consensus, and peaceful relations among the fisher men. 
(Figure Four about here) 
0 
Figure Four finds many strong sanctions exchanged between the 
actors. The movement outflanks the governor by appeal to the center, 
which in turn imposes new sanctions upon the latter. Here, the movement 
cleverly uses intrinsic sanctions involving loss of face to achieve extrinsic 
sanctions, the threatened loss of political and economic support (positive 
sanctions) between members of the polity. A fading public belief in rapid 
growth and growing worry about pollution forms the context. The national 
elites themselves are divided over the issue. As a consequence, the major 
economic ministries (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry 
of Construction) decide to allow the weaker EA to try an unprecedented test 
case of impact assessment in Fukuzaki . 
Figure Five presents the conservative backlash. The local capitalist 
class had grown accustomed to construction contracts and growing markets 
derived from the industrialization project. National capital as well already 
had its branch plants in the project, and had plans to expand these on the 
new landfill. As soon as these classes understood the implications of the 
governor's compromises for their interests, they issued a vociferous public 
criticism of the governor through the LDP. In this way, they threatened to 
- Figure Four: Cit izen Movement Outflanks Governor 
I 1 
E A = Environmental Movement G =Governor 
M= Local Citizens' Movement 
.Issue: Should Fukuzaki Prefecture stop i t s  industrialization .. - pl.ans due to the threat of pbllution? 
= The threat i s  insuff icient to  stop the project. 
= The threat i s  suff ic ient reason to stop the project, a t  
least unt i l  an adeouate check can be done. 
Context: 
1.  National hysteria about pollution dangers. 
2. International c r i t ic ism of Japan for  pollution. 
3. Eli te division over what to do about pollution. 
4. General loss i n  local elections bu LOP. 
Sanc t i on: 
1. Citizen movement threatens EA and governor w i th  loss of 
legitimacy i f  they don't stop the industrial ization project 
2. EA puts inst i tut ional pressure on governor, threatening 
loss of legal permission to  continue industrialization at 
a l l .  
3. Governor compromises by shelving industrial policy. . 
withdraw their crucial support from his upcoming reelection campaign 
(political and economic sanctions). This pressure forced the governor to 
quickly backtrack on how much real content he put into those three 
compromises. He ended up amforming to their letter, but not their spirit. 
This amounted to a symbolic adherence to the demands of the EA and the 
movement, but a de facto rejection 
(Figure Five about here) 
The sanctions exchanged between capitalist classes and the governor 
are primarily economic and political. They involve the threatened 
withdrawal of real resources needed by the governor to win his reelection. 
The context of growing citizen doubt about the virtues of heavy 
industrialization gave added importance to the retention of capitalist 
support. Their resources helped fuel a broad network of patron-client 
relations supporting the governor. But in order to preserve the appearance 
of government as a neutral body, the governor cannot simply renege upon 
the agreed to compromises. Instead, their symbolic continuance maintains 
the general legitimacy of the prefectural government, even while behind-the 
-scenes consultation (nemawashi) with the capitalist class and the LDP 
reassure them that no real obstacle to further industrialization will arise 
from it. 
Several interesting theoretical points emerge from this short sequence 
of event-frames. For instance, the "structure of power" is not solid, 
monolithic and constant. The governor had several alternatives. In a 
different context, he might have decided to use police to suppress the 
movement. But citizens favored their cause, the ministries were divided, 
and the LDP had only a slim majority. The particular context and 
conjunction of sanctions brought him to compromise with the movement, in 
this instance. An analysis without sequential frames, however, might have 
missed this fluctuation in structure from event to event, and latched on to 
one event as symptomatic of the whole. Indeed, this is not to deny that a 
dominant structure may exist in the long run. But the very fact of its 
temporality, not constancy, has important implications. 2 
Furthermore, the kinds of sanctions used in exchanges do not remain 
constant between all the organizations which comprise a structure . Personal 
2 This bears upon the debate about whether the economic or class structure 
determines politics "in the last instance," even if not in the short run. That 
is, with SFA we may analyze at what point a given structure, such as the 
economic, impinges upon the decision-making process, and to what ultimate 
effect. See Broadbent, 1 985, for a fuller exploration of the importance of 
time upon structural theories of the state. 
LC=Local Capitalist C l a s s  WC =National Capitalist Class 
G =Governor L =LDP in the Prefectural Legislature 
M=Local Citizens' Mcvemmt . 
Issue: ~ a p i  t a i i s t s  r e s i s t  ant i-development compromises. 
.: = More i ndus t r i a l  development i s  needed i n  Fukuzeki. 
= Indus t r ia l  development w i l l  ha rm Fukuzaki's 
environment. 
Context:  
1. Large c lass of l oca l  c a p i t a l i s t s  has become dependent 
upon con t rac ts  f rorn the  government f o r  i n f  res t ruc tu re .  
2.  Nat iona l  capita: s t i l l  f i nds  Fukuzaki harbor a t t r a c t i v e .  
3. Continued high pub l ic  fea r  o f  po l l u t i on  
Sanct ions: 
1. Nat iona l  cap i t a l  and l oca l  cap i t a l  g ive  f inancia1 support 
t o  the LOP, and i t  represents t h e i r  i n te res ts ,  so they 
can sway  t he  ree lec t i on  of  the  governor. 
2. Governor uses symbol ic  p o l i t i c s  t o  appear t o  be  f u l f i l l i n g  
t he  compromises, w h i l e  i n  f a c t  f o l l o w i n g  the demands o f  
t h e  c o p i t s l i s t  classes. 
and symbolic sanctions, such as the assertion of moral superiority, may be 
important to weld certain actors together, but may have little relevance to 
their allies. They prefer the provision of economic and political resources. 
In itself, the pattern of transformation from one to another sanction between 
actors has great significance. It differs from society to society, and from 
context to context. What in one society will lead to the use of economic 
reprisal, will in another lead to symbolic ritual 
A h ,  the political effectiveness of a given resource (its convertibility 
to a sanction) varies by context. The context "valorizes" the resource as it is 
employed. For example, the demonstration at the EA by the movement, if 
done in a more conservative time, would have brought police repression 
down upon their heads, and probably much worse suffering than if they had 
borne the original insult without complaint. 
Lastly, we see that third party organizations or publics may act as 
allies even I they are not "convinced." While mwe or less neutral to the 
original issue, they may do so because they are inconvenienced by the fracas 
it is causing. This is obviously a very temporary sort of alliance, but an 
ePPective one for the moment nonetheless. 
1 developed this method of analysis in order to analyze "societal 
decision-making" for the case of regional industrialization in southern Japan 
mentioned above. In full, I use seventeen frames to trace the struggle 
through twenty-five years, from 1955 to 1980 (see Broadbent, 1982). The 
method evolved in the following way. It proved difficult to conceive of the 
- changes in elite and opposition alliances and their interaction over such a - 
long period. Most studiesfocus onone institution,or a very limited set of 
them: elite alliances, public corporations, specific policies, citizens' 
movements. Or, if struggle itself is focused on, the actors are made into 
categories: "the state," "the movement." I became aware of a much more 
differentiated process, in which actors moved from latent to active 
engagement with the issues and struggles. This process in itself was so 
complex that looking at it sequentially proved the only way to grasp it. 
After arranging the action in that way, I became aware that the process was 
genetic; that one action sparked off or activated another. This differed from 
my previous impression of the political process, in which set actors held to 
set positions. 
Looking at the sequence of events, the similarity of each to a network 
of ties between actors became apparent. 3 The actors engaged with an issue 
in any one event were too few to justify a quantitative network analysis. 
The network perspective, however, sensitized me to systemic, inter- 
~ o ~ ~ c t e d  qualities of the whole frame. Distinguishing between Werent 
types of sanctions used by actors pushed this network perspective in a way 
that connected narrative empiricism and individual action with the concept 
of structure. 
3 I owe this insight to the suggestion of Dr. James Ennis, now af Tufts 
University. 
111. Discussion 
Sequential frame analysis itself and the illustrative examples suggest 
certain new perspectives on movement and elite mobilization as a societal 
decision-making process. Briefly, these are: 
1. Resources are not fixed quantities, but are "valorized" by issues. 
2. Resources are not activated as an automatic reflection of interests, 
but require the mediation of "play," discourse and judgement, usually 
through leaders. 
3. Movements develop their strategies incrementally. 
4. Movements encounter different structures at different stages of 
their careers. These constitute "opportunity structures" in a number of 
possible dimensions. Therefore, attention to the process of interaction 
between elites, third parties and movements is needed. 
5. The ties between elites which make up authoritative structures are 
not solely composed of political and economic sanctions. Hence, elites may 
be vulnerable to social and cultural sanctions if appropriately applied. 
6. Actors tend to use the "cheapest" sanction effective for a given set 
of relationships. This implies several "layers" (producing a "front" and 
"back") of types of sanctions around any given actor, producing a lack of 
close correspondence between ideology and action, particularly in the case of 
third parties. 
7. The dominant power structure, and hence the "political opportunity 
structure," is not monolithic. It changes according to the issue, and may be 
composed of a variety of sanctions and structures. 
8. The core elite which dominates a given coalition, and imposes 
structure, has a base in one type of resource. But this is readily exchanged 
for other resources. Hence, as their power extends, the bonds between 
actors change. Movements may strike at these peripheral bonds if it controls 
more of the resources upon which it relies. 
9. The interaction between issues and emergent actor coalitions 
produces unintended consequences. These become new issues which 
produce new actor coalitions. Hence, the process is genetic and stochastic. 
10. The underlying distribution of resources between classes changes 
more slowly than the particular emergent dominant and oppositional 
coalitions. Hence, a latent hierarchy of power exists. But this only becomes 
socially evident when activated by an issue. 
To explain these points in more detail: 
1. The resources held by a given group, including a social movement 
organization, are not fixed but vary for two reasons. The first has often been 
noted: historical social change such as industrialization reallocates resources 
between classes. The second has not been noted to my knowledge: the issue- 
context "valorizes" the resources held by a given group. That is, the resource 
a given actor has may suddenly become more in demand because it helps 
resolve a new social issue. 
For instance, the vote of the blacks in the North became "valorized" by 
the weakness of the national Democratic Party and the decline of the 
Dixiecrats in the South. Likewise, in the Japanese example, the political 
potential and costs of disruption changed in the movement's favor due to the 
issue context. Just as the structure is not monolithic, so too with resources. 
Resources achieve crucial power because the context defines them to be so. 
The power of the church to legitimate a king is negligible until a powerful 
restorationist movement arises. Then the king needs the church, and 
suddenly, the church has new bargaining power. Resource mobilization 
theory (Zald and McCarthy) posits that a change in the distribution of 
resources (time, money, land, knowledge, ... ) allows movements to mobilize. 
But a truely market-oriented interpretation would look to the demand for 
those resources, too. 
Hence, the process of conversion of resources into power, which is 
posited as a function of the movement entrepreneur by McCarthy and Zald, 
is more complicated than that. They imply that the entrepreneur mobilizes 
latent resources that have been redistributed by the process of historical 
structural change. The spread of education puts knowledge into more hands; 
later this is useful to the womens' movement (Freeman). 
While this is certainly a insightful, it does not encompass the entire 
process. According to the frame analysis perspective, the issue itself may 
up the value of a resource, even one that had been there all the time. The 
potential of an issue to do this may help explain the sudden appearance of 
social movments with no apparent relation to an equally sudden increase in 
historically-derived resources. 
2. The power of a given group depends upon its ability to convert 
latent resources into effective sanctions. This conversion occurs when the 
actor becomes aware of an opportunity, or is pushed by a new threat. Many 
forces condition awareness, including cultural traditions and habits, and the 
social relations one has. One who does not wish to cut ties with 
neighborhood friends, may not take action that might arouse their criticism. 
Hence, the use of sanctions is no automatic reflection of one's "objective" 
interests. Furthermore, actors often calculate potential gains and costs, and 
the probability of success depending upon the potential of one's sanctions 
upon the opponents. Sometimes symbolic sanctions will serve to halt an 
opponent, in which case an economically powerless group can wield 
considerable political power. 
Cultural and social structures based on intrinsic sanctions help define 
the "opportunity structure," just as do the political and economic. Hence, any 
study of power and protest must systematically include them. 
Tarrow's initial inquiry into the importance of "discourse" for generating 
social movements addresses the symbolic structural aspect. The relation of 
these structures to those built of extrinsic sanctions may be more than 
"epiphenomenal." Sequential frame analysis gives a systematic method for 
investigating the empirical relationship between them in a given event 
series. 
The ability to distance oneself from the set roles and sanctions of the 
society, to ignore the benefits derived therefrom, is perhaps the crucial 
quality of a movement leader. This allows the leader to avoid cooptation 
back into the dominant insitutions. In social play, social roles are inverted 
and temporarily rejected. Thus, the play process is perhaps the seed bed of 
oppositional thinking. When grievances get strong enough, it is during 
periods of play, of which unstructured intercourse such as in a bar is one 
example, that reflection, criticism and new strategies evolve. I 
3. Movements encounter the power structure incrementally. They 
engage in a developmental process in which the strengths of each are felt out 
by the other. The encounter with dominant elites is most evident in the 
political and economic arenas. There, extrinsic sanctions are used: workers 
strike, farmers chase away tax collectors, police charge demonstrators. 
However, enormous effort goes into delegitimization of each other and 
building social ties with allies, as well. 
However, collective action is preceded by a long period of mobilization. 
In the earlier stage, cultural and social strucutres play a crucial role. If 
dominant elites can control those intrinsic sanctions within the social groups 
where the movement develops, they may be able to defuse or prevent 
collective action. 
The theory of collective action and resource mobilization tries to 
portray movements as rational politics; "politics by other means." This is a 
healthy corrective to the "unruly mob" perspective stemming from Le Bon 
and continued in the collective behavior school. However, many of the 
actions of movements seem to take on symbolic aspects which are hard to 
account for. Tilly interprets this as the slow change of a "repertoire" of 
protest. 
Sequential frame analysis suggests that movements (and often elites) 
do not know the full field of opposition that they will encounter, nor do they 
always try to work out long-range strategies for success. They act for 
rational reasons, but based on their immediate interests and situation. 
Strategic rationality evolves during the process of encounter with dominant 
structures and authoritative elites. 
Movements continually test elite structures in small ways. If they 
achieve a little success, they try more. A strong success becomes a model 
and spreads to other similarly situated groups (Morris). There is a gradual 
escalation or de-escalation according to the early interactions between 
movement and power structure. 
Active engagement over an issue seems to have a short range quality. 
Many groups do not keep comprehensive watch over potential issues, 
although this differs with their degree of institutionalization. Many act only 
when directly threatened. When one group threatens their interests, they 
react. They try to mobilize the necessary resources, apply sufficient 
sanctions, to fend off the threat. In this sense, they are all "reactive." Of 
course, in certain lines of speciality, they may actively seek new benefits, 
such as profits for the capitalist concern. But even there, most companies 
are very conservative. Thus, the process exhibits a stochastic, random 
quality. Each reaction juncture is defined not only by the intrinsic interests 
of the organization, but by the conjuncture of resources, sanctions, interests, 
and issues. 
4. Sequential frame analysis is especially pertinent to the study of 
social movements, because the field is now awakening to the importance of 
context. That is, more and more we see that social movements do not arise 
in a vacuum, but in delicate response to a structure of opportunities that 
define the costs and benefits of collective action. And that actors conceive of 
these costs and benefits within limited ranges, with "bounded rationality" 
(March and Simon). 
Therefore, there is great need for a more detailed approach to the 
"processof responding to protest-particularly as it is mediated by the 
political allies and support groups who make the protestors' case in policy- 
making insitutions ..." This process "inevitably affects the content of reform." 
(Tarrow, pg 48). The methods of research proposed here strike directly at 
that problem, albeit on a case basis. However, the structures which present 
"opportunities" to a movement differ according to the stage of its 
development. That is, if an elite can control the cultural symbols of 
resistance, it can exercise an "ideological hegemony" (Gramsci) that 
undercuts the will to mobilize. Similarly, if elites can control the personal 
interaction within the subject group, perhaps through patron-client 
networks, it can undercut the collective solidarity and discourse necessary to 
mobilization. 
Since this early repression may take place through cultural or social 
structures, the rational strategy of the movement may also emphasize those 
sanctions. Movements may chant religious prayers in order to counter the 
claim of elites to divine right. Movements may preach self-reliance in order 
to counter the old social reliance upon patrons that is making people fearful 
to join. These strategies may seem irrational and unrelated to penetrating 
the structure of power, to entering the polity, unless the analysis includes 
the several dimensions of structure. 
Tarrow notes three components of the strictly political opportunity 
structure: "the openness or closure of political access; ... the stability or 
instability of ahgnments within the political system; and...the availability and 
strategic posture of potential alliance partners."(pg. 28). These three factors 
determine the "rules of the game" in the political structure, what resources 
and actors win and lose. They refer essentially to the coherence and unity of 
the elites who run the major institutions, and their control over the formal 
and infor ma1 channels of policy- making. The movements "bounce off" these 
structures and take shape. The resource the elites hold is seen as, 
essentially, the power to make law and establish policy. Law and policy 
refer to the formal rules of participation in decision-making, and to the 
distribution of benefits from the state budget. Given the wide powers of the 
law, it is no wonder that the state is the target of many movements. 
Movements are seen as a response to opportunities, to openings, in 
this power structure. The openings allow them to penetrate it, to be heard. 
If successful, they get a bigger share of the pie. This certainly constitutes an 
advance in the understanding of movement and structure as a dialectical 
interchange. 
However, there exists at present an unnecessary identification of the 
polity with political means of social control. While the primary resource of 
control held by capitalists is economic means, such as firings, they certainly 
are not confined to that. The state has often been at their service. Why 
then must the struggle between movements and the state be seen as only 
political? Rather, the dominant elite institution may include control of a 
wide variety of resources, and use them selectively to suppress, coopt, 
divert, and demobilize movements. 
Hence, a wide range of structures exist in society, and channel the 
course of change. To understand the context of mobilization, we need to 
include all four dimensions of "structure;" economic, political, social and 
cultural. We need to see these as they form role-sets, and as the mind of 
the role-taker accepts and rejects them. Furthermore, we need to 
understand the mixtures of sanctions, how the structures interpenetrate at 
different levels of the society. 
In other words, the institution through which elites control the actions 
of subordinates may be based on a mix of sanctions, or on strictly social or 
cultural ones. It need not logically reduce to political-economic power at all 
important junctures. The function of the institution defines the basic mix of 
sanctions over which it has control: a political party has influence over the 
legislature through its control over votes; a union has influence with the 
employer through its power over labor. However, this basic sanction may 
be traded by the institution (concretely, the organization) for others, to 
extend its reach. The political party may enhance its legislative potential 
through using dramatic appeals to patriotism (cultural symbols, as dealt with 
in Edelman). The union may enhance the economistic loyalty of its members 
through supporting social ties and solidarity among its members (social 
resources). This is a matter for empirical research in each case. Therefore, 
we need a methodology flexible enough to encompass the potential 
dimensions of power. 
5. The strength of coalitions between dominant elites are an 
important factor in controlling entry to the polity. While these bonds are 
often of mutual economic and political self-interest, they may also be 
composed of cultural and social bonds. It may be possible for movements to 
de-legitimate those alliances and create public withdrawal of support. 
6. Each actor will try to produce the desired effect as easily as 
possible. This sometimes pushes them toward dissimulation, the 
manipulation of others. Deals cut at one point may be reneged in effect, 
while not overtly violated. Politicians' use of "symbolic politics" (Edelman) is 
one example: what they promise and what they deliver may be very 
different. 
Lukes proposed an entire typology of macro-power relations. His first 
is decisional, the kind Dahl presumes to govern a pluralistic polity. Issues 
reach the public arena, where they are decided upon by majority vote. 
"Non-decisional" power means that certain elites have the power to keep 
issues off the serious public agenda, through suppression of its advocates, 
delegitimization of the issue through the media, or control of the legislative 
agenda setting process (Crenson, Bachrach and Baratz). Ideological 
hegemony refers to the control of popular preferences, the shaping of their 
interests and sense of the possible (Gramsci). Finally, social hegemony, a 
term I have coined, refers to control of political action through the control of 
local influentials, who apply their prestige and friendship "capital" on locals 
(Broadbent, 1985a). Actions on an issue taken publicly may be 
countervened by backstage deals, and the public numbed into acceptance. 
Much foreign policy seems to operate this way, as the story of the Vietnam 
War reveals (N.Y.Times, The Pentanon Papers). 
This is especially evident in the case of third party "allies." If the 
necessary sanctions are applied to a given actor, it will often react to 
minimize costs if this does not contradict its own basic interests. Thus, third 
party allies can be created if the necessary resources can be applied. Third 
parties come to the aid of movements or other actors not so much through 
conversion (cultural sanctions) as through being inconvenienced by the 
actions of the movement. 
7. As an issue, such as industrialization, looms closer and takes on 
actuality, different groups get a clearer idea of their potential costs and 
benefits from its social effect. Then they re-evaluate their stance on it. 
Hence, the support alliance may shift. In t,Ms way, cattlemen and 
environmentalists find themselves against strip mining in the South-West. 
Local capitalists and the Communist Party may both oppose local heavy 
industrialization, though for different reasons. Hence, while the issue itself 
stays fairly stable, the groups suporting or opposing it may shift. 
We need to reject the notion that the "power structure" itself is static, 
homogeneous, or monolithic, for all its asymmetrical posession of resources. 
In my own research, I found the distribution of power resources to be a 
latent quality of a society, as Dahl maintains. Issues activate the interests of 
groups, who then mobilize their resources in order to pursue those interests. 
If issues of interest do not arise, those groups tend not to become involved. 
Thus, the process by which a grassroots movement of the powerless 
mobilizes cannot be charted against a constant dominant elite (state, class, 
etc.). Rather, the process of opposition and repression/facilitation must be 
seen as dialectical, as mobilization and counter-mobilization. 
This view offers a solution to why the "power structure" seems to 
change with each issue, as Dahl pointed out. But it should not lead to his 
conclusion--that no continuous power structure exists. I t  does, but it is 
latent. Thus, a hierarchy of potential powers exist for any given issue. 
Change occurs most readily, structure is weakest, where powerful groups 
lack sufficient concern with the issue at hand to fight for it, to maintain the 
status quo. Or, with issues of potential objective interest to them, they miss 
its significance. So they let weaker groups fight it out. 
Emergent organization refers to new ones created by people to meet 
the needs of the time. They emerge from the process of coping. Pluralists 
like Dahl favor this point of view, because it rejects the notion of a solid 
dominant class. Dahl sees the dominant coalition as shifting according to the 
issue, with little continuity. Yet, many other findings report great 
consistency in the dominant groups (Hunter, Domhoff, Miliband). The 
distinction between active and latent structures of power helps resolve this 
paradox. Groups do activate according to their interest. But they still 
maintain a heirarchy of potential power, of resources and sanctions. Thus, 
relatively powerless groups may achieve success on issues which do not 
arouse the concern of more powerful ones. But this should not be taken to 
imply that the polity is pluralistic. 
The concept of "structure" is used in many ways in social science. But 
basically, as its architectural image suggests, it refers to a social force or 
situation that is beyond the power of an individual actor to change easily. 
Hence, it confronts the actor and conditions its actions. The actor must take 
it into account in order to accomplish something. 
Concepts of structure range from the cultural, seen as deep symbolic 
"codes" that condition the very way people perceive, to various types of the 
social, such as social networks, income distribution, sectoral distribution of 
industry, and class structures based on the ownership of the means of 
production. These various concepts of structure are usually treated as 
separate paradigms, within which independent and autonomous analyses of 
society occur. This leads to an unfortunate Balkanization of the social 
sciences, with each sub-discipline plagued by a nagging feeling of 
incompleteness. 
The method of sequential frame analysis provides a step toward the 
resolution of that problem of Balkanization. It operationalizes the concept of 
structure in a way that can distinguish between its different types. That is, 
it assumes that a "structure" is an ongoing exchange system between social 
actors (individual or organizational) that has achieved sufficient regularity to 
appear stable. Several types of structure may interpenetrate each other, as 
in the earlier examples of the Khomeini regime and Japanese industrial 
development. The SFA method can distinguish between them by looking at 
the constituent ties of inter-organizational system, and tracing out which are 
dominant within an alliance of actors. 
Using the typology of sanctions, one can look at the exchanges 
between the organizations and decipher the constituent bonds. Elites which 
are bound together by the power of money from the capitalist class may be 
called class structures of domination. Those in which the coercive power of 
the state is primary: "statocentric" structures. Those in which social ties 
bind together the elites: status structures. Those in which the force of a 
common ideology or set of values: "symbolocentric" structures. This broad 
consideration of structural power provides a wider range of "templates" 
againsat which movements may take shape. In its light, the notion of 
"rational opposition strategy" takes on wider significance. 
The theory of collective action tends to assume that the polity and the 
economy form the crucial authoritative structures against which movements 
emerge and act. This may be true in broad outline, but the micro-processes 
which circulate influence may not be confined to political and economic 
sanctions. And junctures within them may possibly exert great influence on 
the macro-structures over time. These micro-junctures may reflect social 
and cultural structures. 
8. Dominant political groups and "the ruling class" are often 
characterized as if they ruled by control of one resource alone, usually 
money. Conversely, powerless groups are assumed to be so because of the 
lack of resources. What emerges from sequential frame analysis is the 
transformation of sanctions. That is, a decision reached for political necessity 
may be carried out through social connections. 
In a very general way, the principle of the relationship of structures 
in this process seems to be "concentric." That is, economic issues spark 
interests which then apply pressure on other groups. This creates politics; 
politics mediates interests. But within strata where a sufficient alignment of 
interestsis present, negotiation can occur informally, through social 
networks. Social networks (affective and kinship ties) are usually stronger 
within such strata, because interests do not conflict. The process of informal 
negotiation creates and reinfor ces them. Within such socially integrated 
circles, discourse occurs which builds up common symbolic sub-cultures 
justifying the identities, interests, and pursuits of that group. 
Yet, examples may be found where the social or cultural structures 
played crucial roles in the motion of the political-economic. As Weber says, 
ideas are the "switchmen of history;" they can sometimes switch the hurt- 
freight train of political-economic structures (and their impelling interests) 
on to a new track, going to a new destination (Bendix). 
9. The sequential frame analysis presented in this paper shows that 
unintended consequences spring up from the actions of elites as well as 
social movements. For instance, the governor did not expect that his 
compromise with the environmental movement would cause the enraged 
reaction of the capitalist class. This destroyed his fragile agreement with the 
movement, and reasserted the previous structure of power. To trace the 
sequences of interaction which actually generate unintended consequences 
and consequent structural change constitutes a major sociological task. 
1 0. The latent hierarchy probably follows the inherent force of the 
sanctions controlled, in the order of coercive, economic, social, and lastly 
cultural. Thus, an essentially Marxist concept of hierarchy is followed in the 
latent hierarchy. These powerful latent resources are distributed by long- 
range processes of social change, of which the sequential frame analysis can 
only catch the shortest instances. However, at times cultural or social 
sanctions and structures may intervene in the process of historical 
development so as to affect the very distribution of extrinsic resources. 
I V. Conclusion 
Sequential frame analysis offers a qualitative method to analyze the 
micro-interactions between individual actors as indicative of the macto- 
sociological structures which they compose. Because of its generalizing 
tendencies, structural analysis suffers from hypostatization, or 'misplaced 
concreteness attributed to abstractions and concepts. These structural 
abstractions cannot capture the details of real interaction, and hence a 
division between empirical analysis and structural theory sometimes arises. 
Yet, both are necessary wings, if the bird called sociology is to fly. The 
solution lies in breaking down or operationalizing the concepts of structure 
into component types of interactions, so that a connection between structure 
and micto-interaction can be made. However, the number of micro- 
interactions is so vast that most analysts have focused on one level or the 
other, and if the latter. on micro-interactions between one very Limited set of 
actors. What is needed to bridge the gap is a method for selecting the most 
relevant sets of interactions throughout the ommunity or society, and linking 
them together as they interact over a common issue. The societal frame 
purports to do that. 
In addition, it is both fascinating and necessary to understand the 
process by which structures reproduce themselves and change. Macro- 
structures, like the structure of government-business interaction, reproduce 
themselves over time, or usually change more slowly than micro- 
interactions. If the societal frames are looked at in sequence, the precise 
location of change or stability may be pinpointed. The precise micro- 
interactio which began a change in structure may be located. In this way, 
the origins of both stasis and change may be clearly located. Hopefully this 
method will make some small contribution toward the resolution of the 
perennial debates within sociology about these mattets. 
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